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Abstract
Aim: In order to successfully detect, classify, prognosticate, and develop targeted therapies for patients with disorders of consciousness (DOC), it is crucial to improve our mechanistic understanding of how severe brain injuries result
in these disorders.
Methods: To address this need, the Curing Coma Campaign convened a Mechanisms Sub-Group of the Coma Science Work Group (CSWG), aiming to identify the most pressing knowledge gaps and the most promising approaches
to bridge them.
Results: We identified a key conceptual gap in the need to differentiate the neural mechanisms of consciousness
per se, from those underpinning connectedness to the environment and behavioral responsiveness. Further, we
characterised three fundamental gaps in DOC research: (1) a lack of mechanistic integration between structural brain
damage and abnormal brain function in DOC; (2) a lack of translational bridges between micro- and macro-scale
neural phenomena; and (3) an incomplete exploration of possible synergies between data-driven and theory-driven
approaches.
Conclusion: In this white paper, we discuss research priorities that would enable us to begin to close these knowledge gaps. We propose that a fundamental step towards this goal will be to combine translational, multi-scale, and
multimodal data, with new biomarkers, theory-driven approaches, and computational models, to produce an integrated account of neural mechanisms in DOC. Importantly, we envision that reciprocal interaction between domains
will establish a “virtuous cycle,” leading towards a critical vantage point of integrated knowledge that will enable the
advancement of the scientific understanding of DOC and consequently, an improvement of clinical practice.
Keywords: Brain injury, Coma, Consciousness, Electroencephalography, Magnetic resonance imaging, Neuroimaging,
Mechanism
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Introduction and Current State of Science
The last two decades have seen growing interest in the
neuroscience of disorders of consciousness (DOC). Significant progress has led to the differentiation of clinical
phenotypes, including the discovery of new syndromic
entities such as cognitive-motor dissociation (CMD)
syndrome, a condition characterized by behavioral unresponsiveness paired with evidence of covert consciousness (voluntary brain activity). At the same time, this
progress has also highlighted the critical limitations in
our practical ability to diagnose covert consciousness at
the bedside, predict long-term trajectories and outcomes,
and enhance neurological recovery with therapies that
target specific biological mechanisms.
The discovery through functional magnetic resonance
imaging (fMRI) studies [1–3] and scalp electroencephalography (EEG) [4] that ~15–20% of patients with DOC
who lack overt behavioral responsiveness may nevertheless be covertly conscious highlights the critical need for
diagnostic tools that rely on brain activity. Although some
theory-driven approaches already seem promising [5, 6],
further elucidation of the mechanisms underlying unconsciousness in DOC, as distinct from responsiveness, is
a fundamental requirement to guide the development
of new accurate bedside diagnostic tools. Additionally,
almost 90% of patients with chronic DOC do not recover
1 year post injury [7]. Accordingly, there is a need to draw
on large-scale and, ideally, longitudinal clinical studies to properly model prognostic trajectories. Although
some new pharmacological (e.g., amantadine, zolpidem)
and interventional therapies (e.g., deep brain stimulation
[8], low-intensity-focused ultrasound [9]) have recently
emerged for patients with DOC, both case reports and
randomized controlled trials demonstrate only moderate
success. Thus, a better mechanistic understanding of the
different pathways leading to altered consciousness after
brain injury could help develop more effective therapies
as well as tailor more personalized treatment options to
specific patients.
In the present white paper, we aim to identify the most
pressing current gaps in our understanding of DOC and

strategies for closing those gaps. Because DOCs are characterized by heterogeneity, both in phenotype (arousal
and cognitive and motor functions) and brain function,
understanding the specific neural mechanisms of DOC
will require investigation using integrative perspectives.
Specifically, we conceptualize three targets for such
integration: linking brain structure and function, linking microscale and macroscale levels of analysis, and
combining theory-driven and data-driven approaches to
scientific discovery. We further envision that enhanced
synergy between these three domains will provide a
critical vantage point from which to empower diagnosis,
prognosis, and treatment of patients, thereby establishing
a virtuous cycle between scientific advances and clinical
practice (highlighted in Fig. 1).

Methodology
A 13-member Mechanisms Work Group (co-authors
of the present white paper) was convened as part of the
Curing Coma Campaign, Coma Science Work Group to
identify research gaps and approaches to address these
gaps. The work group met weekly from June 19, 2020, to
September 4, 2020, to develop consensus recommendations and on an as-needed basis while authoring the current article.
First, literature review and expert discussion were performed by clinical syndrome: coma, vegetative state/
unresponsive wakefulness syndrome (VS/UWS), minimally conscious state (MCS), and CMD. After a meeting
with the Coma Science Work Group endotype subgroup,
a second round of literature review and expert discussion
was organized to draft the current recommendations,
grouped by research gap theme. The mechanisms are cast
in terms of consciousness vs. environmental connectedness vs. responsiveness (see below). To make progress on
understanding the relevant mechanisms, we have identified three key gaps that need to be filled (Fig. 1): (1)
brain structure vs. brain function, (2) micro- vs macroscale neural mechanisms, and (3) theories vs. data-driven
approaches.

(See figure on next page.)
Fig. 1 Overview of white paper recommendations. In this article, we have subdivided the gaps that exist in the field of disorders of consciousness
(DOC) research into subdisciplines while stressing their mutual interdependence. The term “subdiscipline” is used for each branch of knowledge
that makes up the study of DOC. Specifically, we suggest that efforts should be made to integrate structural and functional correlates, micro- and
macroscale phenomena, and data- and theory-driven perspectives. Within each discipline (e.g., structural correlates), specific gaps should be identified and novel methods should be selected to answer these gaps and to reach an improved state of the science. Throughout this process, iterative
integration with other disciplines is desired (bottom; note disciplines “A” and “B” can be replaced by any given subdiscipline of DOC research). Collectively, improved integration between these subfields of DOC is likely to provide the best avenue toward the clinical goals of DOC science: improved
diagnosis, prognosis, and treatment (center circle). Circular arrows represent iterative processes, whereas two-headed arrows represent bidirectionality, e.g., improved diagnosis is likely to allow for more fine-tuned structural and functional correlates of DOC and vice versa

Fig. 1 (See legend on previous page.)

Results of Gap Analysis
Mechanisms of Interest and Current Gaps: Consciousness,
Environmental Connectedness, and Responsiveness

Disorders of consciousness are characterized by a wide
array of symptoms and etiologies. Consequently, a number of classification schemes across different dimensions
have been proposed that are based on aspects such as
cognitive functions [10], awareness [11] and sensory,
motor, and arousal behavioral functions [12]. With the
acknowledgment that any one framework cannot fully
capture all the constructs relevant to DOC, we propose
to contextualize our recommendations within the framework provided by Sanders et al. [13], which distinguishes
between consciousness, environmental connectedness,
and responsiveness (C-EC-R), as outlined below.
Lack of responsiveness remains the clinical criterion
for DOC. However, there is a clear conceptual distinction between responsiveness (specifically, nonreflexive
behavioral responses) and consciousness (presence of
subjective experience, regardless of what the experience
is about [13]; note that here we will use this term to also
encompass awareness). The possibility for a dissociation
between these two dimensions is sharply illustrated by
the (rare) case of patients experiencing intraoperative
awareness during anesthesia, whose unresponsiveness
due to paralysis is mistaken for evidence of unconsciousness [14–16]. Likewise, independent studies during sleep
and anesthesia (in which retrospective reports can be
obtained on awakening) demonstrate that subjective
experience frequently occurs even in the absence of any
behavioral responsiveness [17, 18]. Within DOC, routine
assessment based on overt responsiveness may be missing covert consciousness in about ~15–20% of patients
[3, 4], a fact that has practical and ethical implications for
the management of these patients.
In addition to consciousness and responsiveness, a
third relevant dimension is environmental connectedness (as originally proposed in the context of anesthesia
[13]). Environmental connectedness corresponds to consciousness of the external environment so that what happens in the environment influences the contents of one’s
consciousness (unlike, e.g., during some dream states).
On the basis of this framework of C-EC-R, patients with
CMD can be characterized as being conscious and environmentally connected but not (overtly) responsive. An
intriguingly similar example of dissociation between
consciousness and responsiveness is found in patients
studied under anesthesia by using the isolated forearm
technique, whereby an inflated cuff on the arm prevents
it from being paralyzed during general anesthesia [13].
Despite the absence of spontaneous behaviors, such
patients can perform simple commands, such as squeezing the physician’s hand (although the potential confound

of arousing nociception due to the inflated cuff should
also be considered). Examples of conscious but environmentally disconnected states include dreaming and dissociative states induced by ketamine; examples of states
that are conscious and environmentally connected but
unresponsive are awareness during general anesthesia
and sleep paralysis, whereby the paralysis that naturally
occurs during rapid eye movement (REM) sleep persists
for a short time after awakening [19]. Of course, it is also
important to consider the notion of behavioral arousal;
although likely neither sufficient for consciousness
(given the presence of sleep–wake cycles in patients with
VS/UWS) nor necessary for it (given the possibility of
dreams during deep non-REM sleep), arousal may nevertheless be a background prerequisite for responsiveness
and possibly also for full-fledged environmental connectedness (Fig. 2).
Current Gaps in Coma Science

Correctly characterizing each patient in terms of the
three dimensions described in the C-EC-R framework
may be valuable for improving diagnosis and determining the prognosis and appropriate standards of care; for
instance, it is especially pressing to establish communication with unresponsive but connected patients and not
only identify reliable biomarkers for conscious contents,
such as emotional distress or pain (i.e., the conscious
processing of nociceptive information), but also identify
whether some environmental stimuli trigger them (environmental connectedness). Additionally, by capitalizing
on the availability of subjective reports after awakening
from sleep or anesthesia in the laboratory environment,
it will be crucial to identify ways to detect environmental
connectedness based on brain function alone.
By identifying the neural mechanisms that determine
transitions between the dimensions of the C-EC-R
framework, it may be feasible to devise targeted treatment strategies aimed at restoring each in their own
right and to identify which personalized avenues may
be the most advantageous for a given patient. Specifically, efforts should be made not only to investigate
whether specific mechanisms identified from studies of
anesthesia and sleep [13] could also apply to patients
with DOC (e.g., to what extent could the isolated forearm scenario constitute a good model for CMD?) but
also to investigate how these different states differ from
one another (anesthesia is reversible on a short time
scale, but DOC may not always be). Additionally, investigations should seek to identify possible dissociations
between each of these aspects in subgroups of patients
with DOC.
Crucially, the limitations of our present ability to discriminate between elements of the C-EC-R framework in

Fig. 2 Putative relationships between consciousness, environmental connectedness, and responsiveness (C-EC-R). Illustrative examples are shown
pertaining to sleep (top ellipse), general anesthesia (bottom ellipse), and disorders of consciousness (middle ellipse). Note that this is not an exhaustive mapping of all possible states of altered consciousness; likewise, this framework does not directly address the question of quantifying residual
cognitive function, as this can only be properly assessed in responsive patients. Also note that the relative size of the colored circles is not intended
to reflect relative prevalence

clinical practice are symptomatic of deeper gaps that need
to be addressed to obtain a mechanistic understanding of
DOC. DOC can arise from a variety of causes, highlighting the need for a more comprehensive understanding
of the intricate interactions between structure and function and of their temporary vs. permanent nature. How
brain function in turn determines C-EC-R also needs to
be clarified, with clear diagnostic utility and prognostic
value for recovery. Likewise, a complete understanding
of the mechanisms underlying the presence vs. absence
of C-EC-R will need to span multiple levels of analysis
[20] and biological detail: from the cellular and molecular

microscale to macroscale systems and networks. Reconciling the distinct levels of analysis will require the concerted interaction of data-driven approaches combining
multimodal data from large-scale studies with theoretical
approaches able to integrate their findings into a coherent
framework, as well as synthesis through computational
modeling. Thus, against the backdrop of the clinical need
to discriminate between consciousness, connectedness,
and responsiveness in patients with DOC, we envision
these complementary approaches as establishing a virtuous cycle to drive forward both scientific understanding
and clinical practice.

Fig. 3 Connectivity in the human brain. a Functional connectivity can be quantified from functional neuroimaging, for example, as the Pearson
correlation between regional blood-oxygen-level-dependent time series from functional magnetic resonance imaging (MRI). b Structural connectivity can be quantified from structural imaging, for example, as the number of streamlines between regions, estimated by using diffusion MRI. c
Network analysis can provide information about individual nodes (e.g., identification of high-degree nodes, or “hubs”) as well as mesoscopic properties (e.g., modular organization) and macroscale (e.g., average length of shortest path between nodes)

Box 1 Brain connectivity and networks

Box 1 Brain connectivity and networks

The term “functional connectivity” (FC) (Fig. 3a) reflects the notion that
similarity between patterns of activity of different brain regions (in
terms of statistical dependency) may arise from interactions between
those regions. At the spatial and temporal resolutions afforded by
noninvasive neuroimaging techniques in humans, neural activity is
most frequently estimated in terms of electrophysiology (using EEG or
magnetoencephalography) or from the blood-oxygen-level-dependent signal measured by fMRI. Activity is simultaneously measured for
each sensor (for EEG/magnetoencephalography) or each voxel (for
fMRI) over a period of time.

Measures of effective connectivity have also been introduced to identify
directed information flow (from region A to region B and not vice
versa). Some effective connectivity approaches rely on probabilistic
accounts to infer the direction of interactions from statistical relationships in the data (e.g., transfer entropy, Granger causality [31–33]).
Another approach to characterize the directionality and strength of
interactions, albeit limited to a small number of brain areas, is dynamic
causal modeling (DCM), which has also been applied to patients with
DOC [34]. The DCM framework is used to infer the direction of connectivity between regions by comparing possible models of how regional
signals were generated. First, alternative models are constructed on
the basis of possible coupling between regions, viewed as nodes in a
directed network. In a second step, the models are compared through
Bayesian model selection to identify the model that best explains the
empirically observed data [35]. Finally, effective connectivity can be
assessed by a perturb-and-measure approach, in which causal interactions are measured by directly stimulating a subset of neurons and by
measuring the responses of the rest of the system. In addition to functional and effective connectivity, structural connectivity can also be
measured in vivo in humans from diffusion magnetic resonance imaging data (Fig. 3b), for instance, through diffusion tensor imaging (DTI),
which can measure the relative diffusion of water molecules along
white matter fibers connecting different regions (although without
providing information about directionality) [36]. Thus, structural connectivity and FC can be related in the same individual [24, 25, 37, 38].

On the basis of these measurements of brain activity, the most common
ways to quantify FC are measures of linear association between pairs
of regional time series (primarily, Pearson correlation, but also methods
based on phase coherence or spectral properties of the signals), which
are therefore agnostic to interactions between more than two elements and ignore the direction of information flow between the two
regions. However, more sophisticated measures also exist, capable of
addressing various shortcomings of traditional FC (although often at
the expense of computational feasibility) [21–26].
Distinct sets of brain regions, termed “resting-state networks,” spontaneously organize into consistently cofluctuating assemblies during both
tasks and also at rest. Prominent among these resting-state networks
are the frontoparietal control network and the default mode network:
these networks typically exhibit inversely correlated time courses at rest
[27, 28], but their interactions are consistently perturbed in unconscious individuals [29, 30].

Whether functional or structural, the interactions between brain regions
can be conceived as a network (Fig. 3c), and the mathematical study of
networks, known as graph theory, can be used to obtain insights about
such networks at multiple levels of resolution [39, 40]: from properties
of individual nodes (e.g., degree, measuring how well connected they
are [41, 42]) to network modules [26] to macroscale properties such as
small-world organization [24, 25, 30, 43–45].

Brain Structure vs. Brain Function

Advancing the science of DOC requires a precise mapping of the heterogenous structural and functional brain
alterations observed in DOC to clinically relevant dimensions (e.g., C-EC-R) across a variety of temporal and spatial scales. Although it is sometimes possible to precisely
map neurological dysfunction to a specific location of
damaged tissue, it is important to emphasize that brain
regions are intricately interconnected, such that local
structural or functional changes may well have far-reaching or even global repercussions on other components
of the network (diaschisis [46]). Classical lesion-based
methods have found success focusing on specific regions
of interest (ROI); however, future work should attempt
an integration of these approaches with the notion that
there exists a many-to-many mapping between brain
structure and functional brain states [47]. A full mapping
between structural and functional correlates of DOC will
require the leveraging of multimodal neuroimaging and
neurophysiological techniques, combined with novel
analytical methods for integrating them, including the
emerging approach of whole-brain computational modeling (Box 2).
Historically, circumscribed lesions and changes in
activity within damaged brains have been used to identify
ROI and model simplified circuits that may be relevant to
DOC symptoms. For instance, the influential mesocircuit
model proposes that because of pathological changes following severe brain injuries, a reduction of thalamocortical and thalamostriatal outflow withdraws drive to the
frontal cortex and striatum, thus implicating basal ganglia–thalamocortical circuits in the symptoms of DOC
[10]. Compared to network or computational perspectives, these focal lesion-based models have the benefit
of providing clear targets for treatment (e.g., via deep
brain stimulation, low-intensity-focused ultrasound,
pharmacological). For instance, emphasis on the role of
the thalamus in DOC has compelled the development of
techniques for its stimulation, which have been associated with improved behavioral responsiveness in a subset
of patients with DOC [9, 48]. Yet the precise functional
roles of key ROI, such as the thalamus, remain far from
fully characterized; indeed, it remains unclear why nearly
full ablation of the thalamus does not appear to result in
a loss of consciousness in rodent models [49] despite its
consistent association with DOC. Thus, focal characterization of structure–function relationships retains unique
value but must continue to be refined.
For instance, although the original mesocircuit model
emphasizes pallido-thalamo-cortical communication,
this model has been updated by the recent discovery of

direct structural connections between the globus pallidus and the cortex, first in rodents [50] and then in
humans [51] by using DTI. In parallel, DCM (see Box 1)
was applied to the mesocircuit and specifically implicated
pallidocortical communication in the transition between
states of consciousness under anesthesia [52]. This example illustrates the kind of multidisciplinary workflow
that should inform the placement of ROI within increasingly complex frameworks (network, computational) for
understanding the structural and functional relationships
underlying DOC.
Compared to ROI approaches, the structural correlates
of DOC may be further detailed by employing mass-univariate, voxel-wise analysis, which can produce mappings
of behavioral symptoms to structural alterations at the
millimeter scale (e.g., voxel-level symptom mapping [53,
54]; also see voxel-level shape analysis [55, 56]). Similar
approaches have been applied to the structural connectome derived from DTI (known as connectome-based
lesion symptoms mapping [57, 58]). Although these
methods allow for a more spatially precise connection
between large-scale functions (e.g., behavioral arousal)
and structural damage, they do not capture the perhaps
more elusive reorganizations in functional networks that
often follow structural insult and that ultimately produce
changes in behavior (e.g., diaschisis) as well as inadequate
or maladaptive compensatory mechanisms, which may
also produce DOC symptoms. Indeed, regions that are
only secondarily affected may be particularly promising
treatment targets because of their relative retained structural integrity, which may hold greater potential to reach
preinjury levels of functioning. To capture the relationship between gray matter atrophy, white matter disconnection, and functional interactions, there is a need to
better integrate structural correlates with the full range of
functional modalities available to us instead of behavioral
symptoms alone.
A jumping-off point for multimodal integration in
DOC may be to overlay the structural correlates of DOC
with the healthy human connectome (both structural
and functional) to derive likely locations for a diaschisis
effect, a method that avoids the often challenging process
of multimodal data collection within patients themselves
[59, 60]. Such an approach could be used to build wholebrain computational models, including the known structural correlates of DOC and known large-scale functional
correlates (Box 2).

Box 2 Whole-brain computational models
Whole-brain computational models represent a powerful set of tools to study macroscale mechanistic
questions in neuroscience [62–64]. Such models
typically combine two fundamental ingredients
(Fig. 4a): (1) information about brain network
structure (e.g., obtained from diffusion-weighted
imaging in humans or invasive tract tracing in
animals) and (2) a model of regional neural activity,
ranging from Kuramoto or Hopf oscillators to the
dynamic mean-field model obtained by mean-field
reduction of integrate-and-fire spiking neurons
with excitatory and inhibitory populations [65]. The
complex interactions of these two key components can give rise to rich and biologically realistic
functional dynamics analogous to those observed
from fMRI and EEG [65, 66]. Although the required
level of neurobiological detail will vary according to
the specific question under investigation, the more
biologically inspired models (e.g., dynamic meanfield) can also be enriched with further information, such as regional myelination or the regional
distribution of specific receptors obtained from
positron-emission tomography (PET) [64, 67–70]
Importantly, in silico computational models offer several advantages: their parameters are fully available
to inspection and manipulation by the researcher,
and they can be perturbed in ways that would not
be possible in either humans or animals [67–70].
Computational modeling allows formulation and
testing of specific mechanisms, a key feature not
provided by other techniques (e.g., neuroimaging). Moreover, the same model can be subjected
to different kinds of perturbations to investigate
which pharmacological or structural interventions
have equivalent results on the model’s function
(Fig. 4b), a powerful avenue to interrogate potential
similarities between anesthesia and DOC. Finally,
the advent of computational models offers the
unique promise to develop personalized models
from each patient’s multimodal neuroimaging data,
and subsequently perform systematic perturbation
of the model to evaluate the potential effects of
different treatment approaches, with the ultimate
goal of informing which therapeutic modalities
may be applicable for a patient

However, multimodal data collection in patients with
DOC—and new methods for merging modalities with
minimal information loss [60]—will be necessary to
account for the inevitable translational gaps between
healthy patients, computational models, and real patients
with DOC. Some recent studies have pioneered these
approaches; for instance, EEG markers have been linked
to subcortical damage in acute [71] and chronic [72]
DOC, and recent evidence indicates that preserved fractal (self-similar) character of structural brain networks is
associated with covert consciousness on the basis of fMRI
response to mental imagery tasks [73]. Inspiration for
future joint investigations of structure and function may
be drawn from other models of disrupted consciousness,

such as anesthesia, in which links between structural and
functional networks have recently been identified [24,
38].
To achieve clinical relevance, it will be crucial not only
to collect increasingly abundant and multimodal data
but also to distill from them the biomarkers that are
most predictive of consciousness, connectedness, and
responsiveness, either in terms of brain states or information structures, which may better explain how functions such as C-EC-R emerge instead of only from where
[62]. For instance, the framework of connectome harmonic decomposition [47, 74] allows for functional brain
activity to be decomposed in terms of different contributions of the human structural connectome [47]. Such
connectome harmonics are wave-like patterns of spatial
oscillations that represent how information spreads over
the structural connectivity of the human brain. Through
this approach, a common neural signature was recently
identified between reduced consciousness in DOC and
under anesthesia [74] and thus may represent a general
signature of consciousness that can inform theoretical
interpretations.
Of course, a plethora of other measures have emerged
in recent years to describe network properties, including
graph-theoretic and information-theory-based measures. The perturbational complexity index (PCI), which
measures the complexity of EEG signals following causal
perturbation by pulses of transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS), appears particularly adept at detecting covert consciousness during sleep and anesthesia, as well
as in patients with DOC, without the need for behavioral response [6]. Other measures of this kind, although
perhaps less accurate for diagnosis, have also shown
significant prognostic value [41, 75]. Future approaches
should seek relationships and convergence between metrics derived from information theory, graph theory, and
dynamical systems theory and strive to connect them
with structural measures. Contemporary examples
include the recent link found between PCI and subcortical atrophy [76] and the recent association between focal
cortical lesions and the generation of pathological slow
waves, disconnection, and lost complexity [77, 78].
Alongside sleep or anesthesia, seizures present yet
another way to interrogate the generalizability of brain
states to the C-EC-R framework in unique contexts (e.g.,
presence of fast-spiking high metabolism in seizures
compared with anesthesia and DOC). This is especially
relevant given that specific deficits in C-EC-R can all
present during seizures in patients with chronic epilepsy
[79–81]. The loss of informational complexity typically
observed during seizures [82] and the restored behavioral

Fig. 4 Overview of whole-brain computational modeling to integrate multimodal and multiscale data. a Whole-brain models combine a model
of local regional activity with information about connectivity between regions. Additional information can be provided about neuroanatomy (from
structural magnetic resonance imaging [MRI]), brain function (from functional MRI), and neurobiology (e.g., receptor density distribution obtained
from in vivo positron-emission tomography [PET]). b Models can be systematically perturbed at different spatial and temporal scales, intervening at
the level of individual regions or their connections

arousal following subcortical (pons, thalamus) stimulation during focal seizures in rats [83] suggests that generalizability is likely to be found; however, this area is ripe
for more investigation.
Importantly, the first steps toward the integration of
structure and function in DOC are largely taking place
by experimental, analytic, and computational integration
of the various neuroimaging methods that probe macroscale phenomena. However, a full mapping of structure–
function relationships must inevitably dive deeper into
the microscale neural substrate on which macroscale networks arise. Indeed, modeling the biological correlates
of DOC across all spatial scales is likely to improve the
location of individual patients within the heterogeneous
space of DOC manifestations (e.g., as defined by C-ECR). Thus, in the next section, we detail the gaps that exist
in our understanding of microscale neural underpinnings
of DOC and coma and how macro and micro levels of
understanding may be bridged.

Linking Micro‑ and Macroscales
A comprehensive understanding of DOC requires that
insights from macroscopic and mesoscopic levels of
inquiry sampled by neuroimaging are integrated with
insights from more microscopic scales: the relevant contributions at the systems, cellular, genetic, and molecular
levels. Because these can largely only be studied directly
in animal models, bridging this gap necessitates a closer
association of preclinical and clinical research and the
generation of hypotheses that can be bidirectionally
tested in both animal and human research approaches.
Animal models that allow relevant direct measurements of such microscopic facets remain limited for
coma [84] and fully absent for VS/UWS and MCS. The
development of functionally relevant animal models
will need to distinguish between the various neurological events (e.g., traumatic brain injury, anoxia, hypoxia
among others) associated with DOC and the subsequent
neurological syndromes of DOC (e.g., MCS, UWS/
VS) [85, 86] to characterize both etiology-specific and
generalizable DOC mechanisms. This could be further
enhanced through comparison with results from sleep
and anesthesia research, in which microscopic mechanisms have been more comprehensively probed in preclinical work [87], producing mechanistic frameworks
that span from whole-brain phenomena, such as individual susceptibility, to anesthetic-state transitions (neural inertia), all the way to genetic susceptibility factors for
anesthesia [38, 88, 89]. Indeed, work in rodents and cortical slices alike has recently demonstrated that neuronal
“off ” periods determine a dramatic collapse of large-scale
interactions and complexity during non-REM sleep and
anesthesia [90–92], which can also be assessed by using

EEG coupled with TMS in humans with brain damage
[77, 78].
In terms of experimental approaches, novel noninvasive in vivo optogenetic techniques allow for the modulation of very specific and deeply seated targets in animal
models [93, 94]. Leveraging these technological developments will enable systematic hypothesis-driven investigations of mechanisms that have been suggested both in
previous anesthetic, sleep, and lesion studies in both animals and humans. Importantly, combining optogenetic
stimulation with simultaneous high-resolution neuroimaging [95] could provide biomarkers to serve as direct
translational interfaces between animal and human
research.
Firstly, a systems-level microscopic perspective
requires a comprehensive investigation of subcortical structures in neuroimaging given the implications
of these structures in animal and translational research
across trauma, anesthesia, and sleep. Specifically, the
historical dichotomy between the cortex as the substrate of contents of consciousness and the thalamus
and brainstem as substrates of arousal has oversimplified the various and diverse roles of subcortical systems
[96]. As a first step, efforts should be directed toward a
detailed mapping of how key subcortical structures (e.g.,
thalamus, brainstem nuclei, and basal ganglia) interact
with specific cortical layers by using high-field structural
and functional neuroimaging and complementary animal models [97, 98]. A relevant example of how current
oversimplified views of the subcortical–cortical interplay
can be refined into region- and lamina-specific accounts
is provided by Redinbaugh et al. [97], who used thalamic stimulation in the anesthetized macaque to reveal
that consciousness-relevant thalamic influence differs
between deep and superficial cortical layers.
Similarly, critical insights at the microscopic systems
level are to be gained from the brainstem neuromodulatory nuclei, which have been extensively studied in animals by using anesthetic and lesion approaches [99–101].
Their associated transmitter systems and brain-wide neuromodulatory projections have been variously implicated
as causing coma [60, 102, 103]. In healthy patients, they
have been found to possibly drive both tonic and phasic
large-scale in vivo brain activity [104–106]. Established
and novel single-photon emission computed tomography approaches [107] and innovative magnetic resonance
sequences (e.g., magnetization transfer images [108]),
combined with increased magnetic resonance field
strengths, will allow these nuclei and their brain-wide
projections to be more directly probed. These approaches
should delineate whether dysfunction of these nuclei
alters their modulation of the whole-brain connectome, which in turn may cause the striking macroscopic

network disruptions commonly observed in DOC. This
should use complementary approaches in both animal
and patient research as well as computational modeling.
Specifically, recent identification of the dopaminergic
system’s relevance for wakefulness from anesthesia models has begun to provide a mechanistic foundation of why
dopamine may have emerged as a key pharmacological
treatment target in DOC [99, 109–112]. To maximize
therapeutic potential, comprehensive assessments of
associated brainstem nuclei should also aim to delineate
whether their dysfunctions in patients with DOC are preor postsynaptic using approaches, such as those demonstrated by Fridman et al. [113], combining PET with
bolus administrations of pre- or postsynaptically acting
pharmacological agents to characterize a presynaptic
dopaminergic release deficit in patients with DOC.
Further progress along the microscopic perspective
requires that differential involvements of particular neuronal types and subtypes in consciousness alterations be
delineated. These studies will largely have to be delivered
by using single-unit recordings and conditional expression approaches in novel animal models to delineate
the relevance of neuronal types, e.g., pyramidal neurons [114]. For instance, anesthetic-induced decoupling
between apical and basal compartments of layer 5 pyramidal neurons in rodents impairs large-scale functional
integration in the brain [115]. These animal experiments
can, however, also be complemented by work in human
neuroimaging by using whole-brain transcriptomic maps
from microarray data, as demonstrated by Craig et al.
[116], who used this approach to delineate that GABAergic cortical interneuron subtypes are differently affected
in anesthesia.
Indeed, it is key to not only characterize the involvement of different neuronal subtypes but equally characterize the role of glia and glial subtypes in DOC [117],
especially given that widespread white matter damage is
commonly associated with these conditions [118, 119].
Both animal models of glial modulation and alteration in
response to trauma/anoxia [120] and new approaches in
future neuroimaging studies [121] will have to constructively integrate white matter structure and function [121,
122]. An area of particular promise is the study of how
microglia mediate systemic and regional inflammation
following both traumatic brain injury and anoxia [123],
leading to DOC. PET ligands for activated microglia and
concomitant longitudinal collection of inflammatory
and cell death markers in blood and/or cerebrospinal
fluid should also distinguish inflammation in acute and
chronic phases of DOC [124]. Animal models should aim
to distinguish neuroprotective and pathogenic inflammatory effects in vivo [125] and distinguish whether pharmacological intervention can induce neuroprotective

states, leading to more favorable outcomes. Similar multimodal techniques can also be used to begin to probe the
roles of other glial cell types, such as astrocytes, whose
role in overall homeostasis of the central nervous system
has been demonstrated in traumatic brain injury and
thus may play a similar role on the DOC spectrum [126,
127].
Finally, the subcellular and thus most microscopic level
holds great promise for future explorations. In particular,
it is necessary to identify genetic and molecular mediators of clinical progression and outcome in DOC. Beyond
relying on analogies from anesthesia, it is required to
delineate specific receptors and particular pathways
that may be associated with the development or persistence of DOC. Although no specific genetic factors have
yet been associated with DOC, genetic risk factors for
adverse outcomes in traumatic brain injury/anoxia serve
as useful and possibly intertwined starting points [128].
However, because human genome-wide association studies require prohibitively large population sizes, insights
across all other levels of microscopic analysis (see Fig. 5)
should be combined into biologically and physiologically
relevant collections of gene candidates to be assessed
with approaches such as transcriptome-wide association
studies [129]. These could identify viable genetic candidates that in turn could be incorporated into both animal
(assessing, e.g., loss-of-function and gain-of-function
alterations) and human experiments (e.g., using microarray data [116]), thereby feeding back relevant, testable
knowledge across all levels of analysis at which we need
to consider DOC mechanisms as well as the theoretical
frameworks that build on them.

Theory vs. Data‑Driven Approaches
Recent research continues to enable a better understanding of the neuronal causes and clinical manifestations of
DOC. Among the approaches that have recently been
developed, we may distinguish purely empirical ones and
those driven by assumptions of certain theories of consciousness. However, in their current state, it seems that
both theories and data-driven approaches are unable to
make predictions precise enough to enable a clear distinction between the neural mechanisms of the three
dimensions of the C-EC-R framework. Yet this mechanistic understanding would carry immense clinical and
ethical significance. For example, one of the key issues
for clinicians is the ability to better predict the presence
vs. absence of pain in unresponsive patients [130] and
what may trigger it. Obtaining such diagnostic biomarkers would require a mechanistic understanding of the
foundations of presence vs. absence of both consciousness and environmental connectedness [13] without reliance on behavior alone. Thus, a convergence between

Fig. 5 Conceptual overview of levels of analysis to be considered in disorders of consciousness (DOC) research across the microscopic-to-macroscopic spectrum. Gradients indicate the capability of a technique to make measurements relevant to the level indicated above, thus highlighting
gaps and possible translational interfaces. Human neuroimaging has produced macroscopic network biomarkers and certain regions/layers whose
disruption is associated with DOC. For inquiries at more microscopic scale, animal models are indispensable, in which experimental manipulations
(DREADD, optogenetics, lesion approaches, etc.) allow for direct mechanistic investigations, which can produce insights that can in turn be tested in
humans in vivo (e.g., by using pharmacological approaches). The wider usage of high-field neuroimaging in both humans and animals will produce
particularly relevant integrations of these levels, which will also serve to produce the type of data required to enable the generation of truly mechanistic computational approaches (e.g., whole-brain modeling). Altogether, these levels of analyses and models are complementary and synergistic
for the discovery of the biological mechanisms of DOC

data-driven metrics (behavioral and neural) and theoretical perspectives on consciousness and environmental
connectedness is needed to improve our ability to estimate the degree of residual consciousness and environmental connectedness (e.g., the presence of suffering) in
unresponsive patients.
Recently, we have witnessed a formidable growth of
new metrics based on neuroimaging [131] for the diagnosis of consciousness and the prognosis of recovery
after severe brain injury. For example, various studies
have shown a reduction in entropy (a measure of signal diversity or unpredictability) when consciousness
fades, e.g., in sleep, anesthesia, and DOC [30, 61, 132,
133]. Although measures of this kind may demonstrate
impressive predictive power, it remains unclear if certain
metrics are relevant for consciousness per se or rather
only represent epiphenomenal correlates (e.g., decline in
entropy might be observed when transitioning from fast
to slow oscillatory activity during anesthesia), and the
above-mentioned EEG complexity has also been dissociated from responsiveness in anesthetized rodents [134].
Thus, although appealing, relying on promising but theoretically ambiguous data-driven metrics in a clinical setting runs the risk of introducing a discrepancy between
what is intended to be detected (e.g., consciousness) and
what is being measured; a similar problem is the so-called
black box in medical artificial intelligence [135], whereby

classification (diagnosis) and prediction (prognosis) can
be successful but for opaque reasons [135].
Various prominent theories of consciousness tend to
emphasize different neurophysiological underpinnings.
For example, integrated information theory (IIT) suggests that consciousness requires a specific kind of causal
interaction between elements of the system capable of
supporting the integration of information [136]. On the
basis of its early theoretical concepts [137–139] that
explicitly linked consciousness to complexity, defined as
coexistence of functional differentiation and functional
integration in the brain, measurement of EEG responses
to magnetic perturbation (TMS) led to successful detection of residual awareness after brain injury (PCI [5]).
Alternatively, the global neuronal workspace theory proposes that information processed in parallel by specialized modules needs to compete for access to a global
workspace of frontoparietal circuits, whereupon it is
integrated and subsequently broadcasted to the entire
brain, becoming available for conscious processing [140–
142]. Some measures derived from graph theory (e.g.,
“small-worldness,” which reflects the balance of local segregation and global integration in a network [40]) have
been argued to capture a decrease in such broadcasting
in conditions of fading responsiveness [30, 43, 45, 143,
144]. However, there is still a need to more specifically
associate these theoretical frameworks (among the many

others) with concrete biomarkers so that empirical data
may more clearly inform on the validity of particular
theoretical interpretations over others. To do so, there
is a pressing need to explicitly clarify, for example, the
constructs of integration and information, as featured in
different theoretical accounts, as well as their underlying
assumptions.
In response to the current gaps and inconsistencies identified above, both data- and theory-driven
approaches should advance toward unified terminology and contents that can be readily compared. First,
we should aim for precise theoretical predictions for
environmental disconnection and unconsciousness
that are distinct from behavioral responsiveness, both
at the information level and in terms of possible biological mechanisms. Indeed, there can be distinct biological mechanisms leading to the same functional or
informational end point (e.g., multiple possible causes
leading to brain states of low complexity). Both data- and
theory-driven biomarkers for DOC should first be verified in conditions in which subjective reports are available (sleep, anesthesia, seizures) and then be precisely
described in relation to their target: the distinction in
C-EC-R (see Fig. 2).
To ameliorate the inconsistencies outlined here, theories should help to identify markers that may be most
discriminative, and in the case of existing data-driven
markers, their proponents should be able to explain their
relevance to particular theoretical perspectives. Ideally,
data-driven approaches should focus on a comprehensive
set of markers indexing different biological levels, e.g.,
from metabolism and resting-state EEG/fMRI measures
to effective connectivity or task-based paradigms. Similarly, comprehensive theoretical frameworks should span
different descriptive levels (e.g., circuit level, information
level, and topological level) and explicitly connect their
predictions to different types of empirical markers.
We acknowledge that comparisons between existing
theories are challenging because they sometimes operate on different definitions of consciousness. Furthermore, biological mechanistic frameworks, such as the
mesocircuit hypothesis [10], may be compatible with a
mathematical framework, such as IIT, when viewed as
providing the required background conditions (e.g., neuromodulators maintaining adequate excitability) that
enable the physical substrate of consciousness itself to
function [76, 145]. Although some recent efforts have
attempted to reconcile concepts derived from different
theories of consciousness [146, 152], a direct involvement of the proponents of each theory in an adversarial
context is most helpful to identify commonalities and
differences in theoretical predictions and come up with
specific experiments through which their predictions can

be explicitly compared. For example, some incompatible predictions of global neuronal workspace and IIT
are now being explicitly tested [147]. Ultimately, such
adversarial collaboration may provide different degrees of
data-driven support for different theoretical frameworks
to make inferences about the presence of consciousness
and/or environmental connectedness in patients with
DOC.

Conclusion and Future Directions
In this position paper, we suggest that bringing together
and integrating different levels of analyses and modalities, different scales, and different approaches, while at
the same time attending to discrete relevant dimensions
(C-EC-R), will prove a challenging but vital approach
to push forward our mechanistic understanding of
DOC (Table 1).
To achieve these ambitious goals, the field will need to
leverage multimodal data in the same patients over time
but also in diverse patients and across different states of
altered consciousness (e.g., sleep, anesthesia, seizures),
as well as in animal models, to enable the generalization
of results. Several categories of techniques stand out for
their ability to provide both improvements within each
area and further integration between them, namely, (1)
increasingly multilevel animal models, (2) analytic techniques for aggregating the various neural correlates of
DOC (e.g., machine learning), and (3) increasingly multilevel whole-brain computational models.
Although direct animal models of DOC remain absent
and our ability to disentangle consciousness from responsiveness in animals remains limited because of subjective
reports being unattainable, animal models continue to
be an important avenue for expanding our understanding of the biological mechanisms of DOC. Specifically,
the expansion of multimodal methods for experimental manipulation in animals provides opportunities to
selectively probe mechanisms and neuronal populations
in the brain. Such work in animals could provide translational bridges from foundational microscale alterations
and effectors to the neuroimaging findings commonly
observed in patients with DOC [148] and thus catalyze
the identification of translatable treatment targets and
strategies.
To make sense of the wealth of data that such increasingly multimodal and multivariate approaches will produce, interrogation through new analytic tools will also be
called for. Machine learning based on neuroimaging data
has already been used to predict prognosis in patients
with DOC [41, 42] as well as to differentiate states of consciousness (wakefulness from DOC or anesthesia) [75].
Nevertheless, predictive models derived from machine
learning can help to both reduce redundancy between

Table 1 Future research needs for investigating mechanisms of consciousness toward improved diagnosis, prognosis,
and treatment of DOC
Research need: establish a framework for differentiating clinical subtypes of DOC with concepts of C-EC-R
Research need: identify links between structural brain damage and abnormal brain function in DOC
Form a complete mapping of DOC structural damage to functions of interest across multiple temporal and spatial scales
Identify structural correlates of relevant biomarkers of brain function in DOC patients derived from different approaches, e.g., information theory, graph
theory, and dynamical systems theory
Research need: provide an integrated understanding of DOC across biological micro- and macroscales
Develop clinically relevant animal models of DOC for translational research approaches
Identify the role of subcortical structures and their interplay with the cortex in heterogeneous DOC
Associate microscale (neuronal and nonneuronal), and subcellular (molecular and genetic) mediators, with in vivo manifestations in patients with DOC
Research need: induce integration between theory-driven and data-driven approaches
Develop precise theoretical predictions and further biomarkers to address each dimension of the C-EC-R framework
Build a comprehensive set of data-driven and theory-driven biomarkers addressing different levels of analysis
Compare and develop existing theories in adversarial collaboration between theory leaders
Research need: integrate levels of description, imaging modalities, and theoretical approaches
Analyze multilevel and multimodal data from large-scale data sets to construct more realistic computational models of DOC
Develop personalized medicine models to guide treatment based on individual patients’ multimodal data
C-EC-R consciousness, environmental connectedness, and responsiveness, DOC disorders of consciousness

metrics and identify synergy between many identifiable
neural correlates of DOC to distill clinically relevant predictions (e.g., probability of recovery, likelihood of covert
consciousness).
In this vein, the increasing richness of empirical data
can be leveraged to develop increasingly realistic computational models of DOC. In silico whole-brain models
offer an especially promising avenue, with their potential
to combine macroscale information about brain structure
and function with considerations of microscale neurobiology [62–64] (Box 2) as well as related empirical data
and theoretical perspectives at multiple levels (e.g., how
systems-level accounts of DOC interact with information
perspectives). Indeed, successful models of anesthetic
states have already been put forth [149–151]. Therefore,
computational models could provide means to address
each of the three gaps we have identified, with the potential to aid personalized medicine.
Throughout this article, we have emphasized that
closing the gaps we have identified must be understood
as a synergistic endeavor. Addressing gaps at one level
(e.g., the relationship between micro- and macroscale)
will also inform our understanding of the interactions
between brain structure and function. At the same time,
closer translational interfaces between these areas of
study will thereby inevitably emerge. Likewise, in addition to addressing the specific questions and challenges
outlined here, large-scale multimodal data sets across
humans and animals will provide the basis on which
data-driven approaches and subsequent modeling can
be developed further and refined. Finally, bidirectional

interaction between scientific investigation and clinical
practice will continue to play a fundamental role, with
models and biomarkers informing prognosis and treatment while being informed by clinical insight, engendering a virtuous cycle. Nevertheless, we do not consider
bridging these gaps as the end point of coma science but
only as a new vantage point—a vantage point of integrated knowledge across levels, imaging modalities, and
theoretical approaches—from which to pursue our goal:
curing coma.
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